On Friday, the military forces of the United States and South Korea concluded their annual joint exercises six days ahead of schedule, as a conciliatory gesture toward North Korea.
米国と韓国の軍は金曜日、北朝鮮への融和的なジェスチャーとして、年次合同演習を当初の予定より6日早く切り上げて終了した。
However, the North Korean side expressed the view that this measure alone is utterly insufficient to persuade them to return to the negotiating table.
しかし北朝鮮側は、この措置のみでは交渉の場に復帰するよう説得するには到底不十分であるとの見解を示した。
President Donald Trump had, on a prior occasion, abruptly directed the Department of Defense to "substantially scale down" the "Ulchi Freedom Shield" exercise, which had been slated to commence on Monday.
ドナルド・トランプ米大統領は先般、月曜日に開始される予定であった「乙支フリーダムシールド」演習を「大幅に縮小する」よう国防総省に対し、突如として命じていた。
As justification, Trump cited his amicable rapport with North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un, as well as Seoul's refusal to lend its support to the United States in the Iran conflict.
トランプ氏はその根拠として、北朝鮮の金正恩国務委員長との良好な関係、ならびに韓国がイラン戦争において米国への支持を拒否したことを挙げたのである。
According to the original blueprint, the exercise slated for this month was reported to have been conceived as a two-phase operation, predicated on a hypothetical North Korean assault, and was to have unfolded over an eleven-day span.
当初の計画によれば、今月実施される演習は、北朝鮮による攻撃を想定した二段階構成で、十一日間にわたって展開される予定であったと報じられている。
The initial phase was engineered as a defensive campaign culminating on Friday, whereas the subsequent phase was devised as a counteroffensive to persist until the twenty-seventh of August.
第一段階は金曜日までの防衛作戦、第二段階は八月二十七日までの反撃作戦として設計されていた。
North Korea has evinced an exceptionally acute sensitivity, particularly with regard to the second phase.
北朝鮮は、特に第二段階に対して極めて敏感な反応を示している。
Furthermore, the Republic of Korea and the United States had originally scheduled a total of fourteen joint field training exercises during the Ulchi Freedom Shield period; however, according to an announcement by the South Korean military, an agreement has likewise been reached to halve this number.
韓国と米国はまた、乙支フリーダムシールドの実施期間中、合同野外訓練演習を計14回計画していたが、韓国軍の発表によれば、これもまた半減させることで合意に至ったとのことである。
Kim Yo-jong, the influential sister of Chairman Kim Jong-un, dismissed Trump's proposal on Wednesday, asserting that even if the duration and scale of the exercises were reduced, their "provocative and aggressive essence" would remain unchanged.
金正恩委員長の影響力ある妹である金与正氏は水曜日、トランプ氏の提案を斥け、演習の期間と規模を縮小しようとも、その「挑発的かつ攻撃的な本質」は不変であると述べた。
The following day, North Korea launched approximately ten short-range ballistic missiles toward the sea.
翌日、北朝鮮は約10発の短距離弾道ミサイルを洋上に向けて発射した。
This is interpreted as the materialization of threats repeatedly intimated in the past, serving as retribution for the joint US-South Korea exercises, which are regarded as a rehearsal for invasion.
これは、侵攻の予行演習と看做される米韓合同演習への報復として、従前より繰り返し示唆してきた威嚇を現実の行動に移したものと解釈される。
The United States Indo-Pacific Command articulated its assessment that these developments do not constitute any direct threat to U.S. territory or to its allies.
米太平洋軍は、これらの事象が米国領土または同盟国に対していかなる直接的な脅威をも構成するものではないとの見解を示した。
Furthermore, it unequivocally affirmed that the United States continues to maintain an unwavering commitment to the defense of the homeland and of its allies in the region.
さらに、米国は米本土ならびに地域における同盟国の防衛に対し、引き続き揺るぎないコミットメントを維持していると明言した。
Kim Yo-jong's statement served to utterly extinguish any prospect of an early resumption of negotiations between Mr. Trump and Kim Jong-un.
金与正氏の声明は、トランプ氏と金正恩氏の間における早期交渉再開への期待を完全に挫くものであった。
The initial nuclear diplomacy between the two leaders had already collapsed in 2019.
両首脳の初期の核外交は2019年に瓦解していた。
Kim Jong-un has deftly exploited the diplomatic impasse, augmenting his own leverage through the modernization of his nuclear and missile arsenal and his alignment with Russia in the Ukraine war.
金正恩氏は、核・ミサイル兵器庫の近代化とウクライナ戦争におけるロシアとの連携を通じて、外交的膠着状態を巧みに利用し、自らの影響力を増強してきた。
Last year, Kim Jong-un intimated that he would not countenance a return to the negotiating table unless the United States relinquished its demand for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as a precondition for diplomacy.
金正恩氏は昨年、米国が朝鮮半島の非核化要求を外交の前提条件として放棄しない限り、交渉の場に復帰する意思はないと示唆していた。
Nevertheless, Kim Yo-jong employed comparatively measured language, eschewing the vitriolic rhetoric characteristic of North Korea, while alluding to what she characterized as the 'wonderful' rapport between her brother and President Trump.
それでも金与正氏は比較的慎重な言辞を弄し、北朝鮮に典型的な過激な修辞を回避しつつ、兄とトランプ氏との間の「素晴らしい」関係と称するものに言及した。
This suggests that Pyongyang harbors no intention of irrevocably shuttering the door to future negotiations, but rather may be endeavoring to extract more substantial concessions from Washington—such as international recognition of its nuclear-weapons status or sweeping sanctions relief.
これは、平壌が将来の交渉の扉を完全に閉ざす意図はなく、核保有国としての国際的承認や広範な制裁緩和といった、より大きな米国の譲歩を引き出そうとしている可能性を示唆している。
The probability that North Korea is securing economic and military assistance in return for supplying ammunition and personnel to Russia is exceedingly high, and the deepening of its relationship with Moscow serves as a negotiating lever to extract more substantial support from China, its foremost trading partner.
北朝鮮が弾薬と兵員をロシアへ供与することを通じて、見返りとして経済的・軍事的支援を獲得している蓋然性は極めて高く、ロシアとの関係深化は、最大の貿易相手国である中国からより大規模な支援を引き出すための交渉上の梃子として機能している。
"Once this strategic maneuvering reaches a provisional denouement, Kim Jong-un may well seek to extract further economic and reputational dividends from Washington," remarked Leif-Eric Easley, a professor at Ewha Womans University in Seoul.
「この戦略的駆け引きが一応の決着を見た後、金正恩氏はワシントンから更なる経済的・名声上の利益を引き出そうと模索する可能性がある」と、ソウルの梨花女子大学教授リーフ・エリック・イーズリー氏は述べた。
"However, that is likely to materialize only after the U.S. midterm elections, at a juncture when Trump is anticipated to be politically vulnerable domestically and yearning for a headline-grabbing foreign policy initiative."
「しかし、それはおそらく米中間選挙後、トランプ氏が国内政治的に脆弱な立場にあり、耳目を集める外交政策を切望していると見込まれる時期に到来するであろう」。
Professor Kim Dong-yub of the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul observed that Kim Yo-jong’s statement articulates Pyongyang’s position that the personal rapport between her brother and President Trump “cannot serve as a determinant in the current trajectory of North Korea–U.S. relations.”
Professor Kim Dong-yub of the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul observed that Kim Yo-jong’s statement articulates Pyongyang’s position that the personal rapport between her brother and President Trump “cannot serve as a determinant in the current trajectory of North Korea–U.S. relations.”
He further contended that Kim Yo-jong likely sought to preempt speculation that Trump’s overtures could resuscitate diplomatic engagement, thereby insulating the regime from wholesale opprobrium should such rapprochement fail to materialize.
He further contended that Kim Yo-jong likely sought to preempt speculation that Trump’s overtures could resuscitate diplomatic engagement, thereby insulating the regime from wholesale opprobrium should such rapprochement fail to materialize.
Kim Yo-jong categorically repudiated Trump's assertion that Kim Jong-un had acceded to his overtures for dialogue.
金与正氏は、金正恩氏がトランプ氏の対話要請に応じたというトランプ氏の主張を、断固として退けた。
When queried by reporters on Wednesday regarding the prospect of a meeting with Kim Jong-un within the year, Trump responded without hesitation, "Oh, we'll meet."
水曜日に記者団から、今年中に金正恩氏と会談する可能性について問われたトランプ氏は、「ああ、会うだろう」と即座に応じた。
Ulchi Freedom Shield constitutes one of the principal annual military exercises conducted jointly by the United States and the Republic of Korea, designed to bolster their capacity to counter potential acts of aggression by North Korea.
乙支フリーダムシールドは、米韓両国が毎年実施する主要な軍事演習の一つであり、潜在的な北朝鮮の侵略に対処する能力を強化することを目的としている。
Its curtailment has given rise to apprehensions regarding the combined readiness posture of the two allies.
その縮小は、米韓の共同即応態勢に対する懸念を引き起こしている。